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Andrew Abbott 
University of Chicago 
 
 
 Let me begin with the obvious. I am about to give you a lecture. I have a real argument, 
one that cannot be represented by a diagram of colorful but undefined blobs and arrows. There 
will be words, sentences, paragraphs, logic. Ten years of ideas are crammed in the next fifty 
minutes. 
  And yes, you can safely infer from my tone that I do not believe in a great new advance 
in knowledge; or that today's undergraduates are better educated and better multitaskers than 
yesterday's; or that their papers are better than those of their parents whom I taught thirty years 
ago; or that my younger colleagues' research is better than ours was at their age; or that the new 
world of reference tools is better than the old. That's the polite way of putting my personal 
feelings, which are mainly a mixture of anger and contempt at what I view, on both historical 
and theoretical grounds, to be folly and stupidity. But while as a library researcher, I am 
passionately committed to research libraries and the pleasures and wonders of working in them, 
this talk needs to detail a careful argument, so the sociologist of history and knowledge must do 
the talking. 
  My basic analytic message is that a number of different historical forces, of varying 
historical depths and importance, both external and internal to scholarship, have combined to 
make this a particularly desperate moment for the library-based research enterprise. Research of 
this type has always been a largely parasitic activity, particularly in the humanities and social 
sciences. Few people in the society care much about it, and the resources it has acquired were 
gathered in the name of other things and while no one was looking. Now that the larger 
historical conjuncture has turned against it, it is as usual without defense. The fact of the matter 
is that real intellectual life in these fields may soon leave the universities. 
  Let me begin with some theory about how social change happens. The social world is 
continually changing; that is why it is actually more proper to speak of "the social process" than 
"the social world." But continuous social change is generally restrained by the woven net of 
local stabilities and vested interests that is our everyday world, as well as by the fact that 
change is usually happening at different rates and in different directions in the various parts of 
the social process. Major social change becomes a possibility only occasionally, when a number 
of such sub-processes happen to become aligned, all of them presenting the possibility of 
change at once. 
  This is such a moment, with alignment among external processes as well as among 
those internal to academic life itself. The external processes are more familiar, and I begin with 
them - five processes that shape intellectual life in the humanities and social sciences and that 
have simultaneously entered moments of transition. I shall discuss them in order, from the local 
changes to the broadest ones. They are: 
  1. The demographic evolution of universities and academia 
 2. Neoliberal university management 
 3. The invasion of knowledge by profit-oriented capitalism, 
  4. The emergence of a one-size-fits-all model of knowledge 
  5. The cultural transition from verbal to imagistic media.  
 
1. Demographic evolution. 
  The modern university system in American began in the late nineteenth century with 
the creations of Johns Hopkins, Clark, and Chicago - the first European style universities in 
America. Harvard, Yale, and the rest soon joined these three in creating a new type of 
university, with a German graduate school top and an English undergraduate school bottom, 
linked together by one faculty and democratized in various ways. The more advanced of the 
land grant schools emulated the new model. 
  Initially, the university system was tiny, educating perhaps 2% of the 18-24 year-old 
cohort, virtually all of them men. But it expanded steadily through the First World War, passing 
5% of the cohort in 1920, and growing exponentially between the wars. After the Second World 
War it expanded exponentially again until around 1970, living off GI bill funding and the influx 
of women. By 1970 it was enrolling a third of the two-gender cohort. Paralleling the expansion 
was the upgrading of college faculties, which finally reached the standard of "PhDs for all A&S 
faculty" some time after the Second World War. 
  The rapid expansion meant what rapid expansion means in any demographic system. 
Most faculty were young. Graduate students outnumbered junior faculty who in turn 
outnumbered senior faculty. Since young people have fewer obligations and more time to read 
and think, there was on average more reading and thinking. And since few faculty were in the 
ages then characterized by extensive scholarly writing, there was much less to read. Moreover 
the strong seller's market for academic talent created by the expansion meant there was no 
pressure for young people to publish. The result was that in the late 1920s a scholar could read 
everything published annually in his entire discipline if he read about 500 pages a week. That's 
a documented fact. 
  Since it lasted for about seventy years, this expansionary demography established 
normative models for graduate education, research, and the scholarly life course in the 
humanities and social sciences. The system was unhurried. Scholars took time with major work. 
By comparison with later periods they spent much more time actually teaching students, both 
graduate and undergraduate. There were lots of graduate students for few senior faculty. There 
was a lot of reading and thinking, but much less writing. At the same time, most of what was 
written was actually read. 
  With the ending of expansion, this demography rapidly changed. The PhD market 
became a buyer's market, with consequent pressure to publish more and to publish earlier. The 
resulting publication explosion was not caused by increases in intelligence, expertise, training, 
or "critical mass." It was purely demographic. If one inspects the PhD publication series of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century universities - a purely routine form of publication 
required for the degree and typically paid for by the student - one finds them filled with fine 
efforts, every bit as excellent as today's hot new monographs from the University of Chicago 
Press. But these dissertations were seldom read, even then; they were simply statutorily 
required publications. Today, by contrast, my graduate students must try to publish the course 
papers that even my own generation gladly threw away. 
  The new demography also meant that the average age of professors rose more than ten 
years. So the increasing amount of publication faced a professoriate at ages where it typically 
had less time to read, because it was more busy with middle-aged things like book series, 
centers, and other forms of institution-building. The scholarly world became subdivided, 
pressured, rushed. All of this happened because of an inevitable demographic transition. Our 
"traditional" model of graduate school was in fact definitionally a transitional one, because it 
was, in fact, built on a Ponzi scheme. There is nothing to be done about this - the old 
demography of the university can never return. Indeed, such a structure can only return if 
intellectual life leaves the universities and starts over in some other institutional location, where 
exponential expansion would be again possible. 
  2. Neoliberal Management 
 My second transition is involves management. Universities have in the last thirty years 
been seized by a neo-liberal management largely external to the intellectual enterprise. This 
change has roots in various earlier transformations. Educating 40% of all 18 year olds of both 
sexes is qualitatively different from educating 2% of all 18-year-old, mainly elite, men. It 
necessarily involves mass teaching. Since less than one quarter of the economy's jobs require a 
bachelor's degree, it necessarily involves vocational education. Given the decline in the 
country's secondary education system, it necessarily involves remedial training. Moreover, 
universities house multiple freestanding research institutions as well as enormous medical 
establishments and numerous professional schools. They run large physical plants and employ 
tens of thousands of people. 
  Having become giant businesses, the universities are managed as such, and the current 
trend of university management is predictably anti-intellectual. The arts and sciences faculty 
with its pure research is just one of twenty or thirty such units, in effect just another division of 
the university. In most cases it is among the most prestigious, but also among the most 
impoverished. Like most managers at a distance, university administrations administer such 
faculties as if they were manufacturing firms. They tout intellectuality, but in practice they 
count articles. 
  By creating such intellectually perverse incentives, neoliberal management has in effect 
destroyed the system of scholarly communication. The majority of scholarly publication in the 
social sciences and humanities today serves no purpose other than providing grist for 
evaluation. The very authors of the articles know that perfectly well. Take my lecture today. 
Fifty years ago such things were never published. Now, I and my colleagues do our best to 
publish every single one. 
  The facts proving the meaninglessness of most current publication are many. We know 
that in the United States, the rates of scholarly publishing per scholar are much higher today 
than they were prior to the 1970s, even though there is no reason to think those earlier scholars 
stupid, or lazy, or untrained. We know also that publishing has become common at younger and 
younger ages, even though graduate students today are no smarter or better educated than their 
predecessors. Moreover, we know that - in part because of this decline in quality - no one is in 
fact reading much, as can be easily seen from the disappearance of citations that identify 
particular pages as sources rather than entire articles or books. I have carefully read a year's 
worth of articles (110 of them) citing my own first book, for example, and it is clear on internal 
evidence that at least half of those who cite my book do not understand its main argument and 
that at least 10% of them cannot possibly have read even a chapter of it. 
  This degradation of our communication system can be remedied only by two strategies. 
First we must defend the elite of journals against second-rate work. This will prove difficult, as 
the pressure to print graduate student material is great, and the willingness to conduct real peer 
review is declining. Second, we must change the evaluation system for academics. The late 
Roger Gould, one of Yale's most distinguished sociologists, used to suggest that we should 
announce that we would read only 75 pages for any tenure case, but that we would read them 
very well. Perhaps if ten great universities made that change, we could stem the tide of garbage. 
  Another dangerous effect of neoliberal management is what is called coercive 
isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism labels a situation in which all units are forced by 
competitive pressures to be alike, typically because of implicit or explicit rating schemes. The 
most familiar example in academia is the 19-student class, enforced by US News’s definition of 
the "small class" as under 20 students. From the point of view of library research, the 
consequence of coercive isomorphism is that it prevents any consortium solution to the problem 
of the disappearing research library. It is obvious to everyone that the national research system 
in the humanities and social sciences needs at least a few great research libraries in which 
everything is onsite and immediately available. But no single university has the money to fund 
such a thing, many of whose users would be faculty elsewhere who are losing their browsable 
libraries and who would need to travel to a consortium facility. At the same time, everybody 
who would not have such a consortium facility has the incentive to be hostile to the creation of 
one elsewhere. The same process caused opposition to the creation of CRL sixty-five years ago, 
and as older librarians know well, also explains the longstanding refusal of university faculties 
to countenance collection specialization among university libraries. In any case, the fact is that 
if we want there to be ANY great browsable research libraries in the United States, we have to 
turn the existing possible candidates into consortium institutions, with immense main libraries 
and active fellowship programs providing short to medium length stays for those scholars from 
elsewhere who need to work in such environments. That's why Chicago built the Mansueto 
Library.  
 
3. Invasion of the Capitalists. 
  My third transition is the invasion of knowledge by the for-profit world. I don't need to 
tell any of you about this. The days of the beneficent monopolist H. W. Wilson are long gone. 
At first it seemed that the capitalist plan would be simply to buy all the material of scholarship 
and then rent it out. That proved impossible, although Google tried and will try again and again 
until it can smash copyright and achieve the monopoly it desires. The interim strategy is to 
create a new means of access and then charge monopoly rents for it. The real money was to be 
made in the sciences, which were backed by massive industrial and government funding, and 
where intense inter-university competition guaranteed the effectiveness of scare-tactic sales 
strategies. Hence the rapid amalgamation of all science journals and the banditry of Elsevier. 
Better yet, the monopoly publishers discovered that the pressure to publish provided by the 
buyer's market in academic talent and the bean-counting of the deans meant that faculty had 
incentives to found infinite numbers of new journals, which could then be charged for, etc. 
Financially, of course, the humanities and social sciences world was not worth the trouble, but 
consolidation simply swept them along with the more profitable sciences. 
  This system is of course scientifically pernicious - the publishing of unimportant crap is 
just as problematic in science as elsewhere - but it has also siphoned considerable money away 
from other things: budgets for services, for collections in other areas, digitization, preservation, 
and so on. Deep down, it is clear that to many people knowledge seems a natural commons, that 
it can all be stored in one place, delivered electronically, and paid for on a fee for service basis 
that supports maintenance and perhaps research, on the old ATT plan. Quite aside from whether 
current capitalism would abide such a socialistic dinosaur, it's not clear what the future would 
be for research librarianship in that scenario. 
  In the medium run, it's clear that many of the traditional functions of research 
librarianship have been taken over by the vendors: much of cataloging, indexing, research 
bibliography, reference services, even acquisitions. For the smaller libraries this may have been 
a good thing. For the larger ones, it is more worrisome. The vendors' work seizure has forced 
librarians towards service - guiding the students and even the faculty through the vendor world, 
which is made chaotic by the continuous sale and redesign of particular tools. Hence also the 
attempt of librarians to teach students how to do research, something in which librarians have 
usually not been trained, but which the faculty is apparently not bothering to teach, and which 
so serves as an obvious new work area for professional survival of research librarians.  
  For the researchers, the great invasion of the vendors and their digital stuff has several 
important consequences. First, the theoretical expectation is that expanded access has probably 
lowered the average quality of research. Since librarians always selected material on quality, 
the "more" that is available is generally of lower quality and importance. Moreover, the best 
scholars already had the best access, so the new work is being done by lower-ranking scholars 
(although scholarly oversupply militates against this.) So it is probable that universal weakens 
the research enterprise as a whole. My own experience with students and even colleagues is that 
it simply loses weak researchers in the welter. 
  Second, this new welter is the harder to handle because the digital move has reduced 
real indexing. The quality difference between conceptual indexing and keyword indexing is 
enormous, and the conceptual indexes are nearly all gone. Even back of the book indexes are 
degenerating into keyword indexes and, ominously enough, our students in fact believe that the 
indexes in pre 2000 books were keyword indexes produced by hand. In fact, our students do not 
have even the idea of conceptual indexing. On the automation front, there is no sign that the 
"topical analysis and themes" algorithms in text mining are going to do any better than did 
previous types of cluster analysis, which have been with us for fifty years without affecting the 
course of scholarship in the slightest. So the bottom line here is that real indexing and, more 
dangerous still, even the IDEA of real indexing are fast disappearing. 
  Third, it seems probable that the digital tools have furthered among  faculty the decline 
of reading that was previously under way for life course and overload reasons. The avalanche of 
material now available is so large and of such mixed and indeed imponderable quality that it is 
in most cases impossible to do anything more than cruise abstracts and read an occasional 
article based on some Bayesian prior about its quality: venue, author, dataset, etc. Most articles 
are, in effect, immediately archived, to be retrieved only if they prove useful to someone and 
can begin the process of becoming citations. Piling-on processes in citation - and, I am 
embarrassed to say, the increasing practice of referees in asking themselves to be cited - lead to 
the eventual take-off of certain works as citation classics. As I noted earlier with respect to my 
own classic, there is no indication that these particular works are actually read. 
  To be sure, the digital tools do permit some things never before possible, and 
eventually - perhaps in forty years - there will be disciplines of quality for automated work with 
digital tools. At present, their main use in the humanities and social sciences - via data mining - 
is simply to produce junk. I have worked with these techniques for thirty years - long before 
anybody outside of a tiny research community even knew about them - and am quite confident 
of this judgment. Like any advanced technique that has been commodified and put in the hands 
of people who don't understand it, it is worse than useless, flooding the market with garbage. 
  In short the digital impact on scholarship is almost entirely negative, because of 
overload, loss of indexing, decline of average quality, and the ensuing decline of reading. This 
is not because positive impact is not possible, but because it would be very expensive for its 
return, and the vendors are bottom line firms. They are happy to profit from monopolies, but 
actually aiding real research is not something that will produce profits. Therefore, every single 
major indexing tool has had its front end steadily dumbed down steadily, in the attractive and 
democratic name of "universal access," of course. But nobody really believes that undergrads 
are going to do great things using "America: History and Life." Rather by dumbing down the 
front end the vendors feel that they can get more universities and colleges to subscribe. The 
result of course is to keep the front-ends constantly changing - just what an expert doesn't need 
- and to push important information about coverage, gaps, relevancy algorithms, and so on off 
where it can't be found. Every single one of these major tools is of lower quality today than it 
was in print, and every single one gets harder and more dangerous for scholars to use as it 
dumbs down for the undergraduate market. All the vendors want from the scholars is 
legitimacy. They want it admitted that their lies about quality are true. They aren't. They're just 
lies. Often, the vendors do not actually know what their tools are doing, as I have shown 
elsewhere. 
  I may as well say here what is going to happen, since there's nothing really that we can 
do about it. What will probably happen is that the vendors will ultimately break up the 
copyright law in such a way that there will exist some one or a few single repositories for all 
sources in humanities and social sciences. Access will be fee for service, with all the perverse 
incentives and hierarchical effects that implies. The net effect on knowledge, because of loss of 
real browsing, decline of indexing, disappearance of quality, and so on, will be negative for at 
least 25 years. In effect, they will trash what the twentieth century thought was knowledge. 
"Knowledge" will be redefined to mean whatever it is that Google et al. deliver. After about 
fifty years or so, some group will emerge inside Google or whatever it is then called, which will 
reinvent real knowledge, just as the universities were reinvented by intellectuals in the late 
nineteenth century. We will not be around for that, but it will happen eventually. And we will 
then be eventually rediscovered and claimed as precursors in the scholarly battles of that later 
era. That's what is going to happen.  
 
4. The One-Size-Fits-All Model. 
  My next great transition is the emergence of the one-size-fits-all model of knowledge. 
There is at present in the culture a notion that that there is only one type of knowledge, and that 
is science - or since science isn't really science any more - technology. 
  This is a quite general trend, but its implications for library research are quite specific, 
because essentially they mean that scholars with no training or even interest in the subject 
matters of the humanities and social sciences are in the process of invading those areas of 
knowledge, producing large amounts of very flashy results, and claiming to have answered the 
main questions which have so long confused their stupider brethren. Thus the physicists have 
taken over social network analysis and think they can answer the major questions about social 
structure with a few months of reflection and modeling. Thus the data miners have created their 
giant corpora  of published texts and will soon announce that their algorithms have solved the 
intellectual problems of the humanities. Such groups not only think they can answer all the 
important questions that have puzzled the social scientists and humanists, they also feel that the 
questions their methods cannot answer are for that very reason unimportant questions. Indeed, 
for them, matters their methods cannot address are simply noise or chance. These new 
"scientists" of the human thus redefine the great questions of the humanities and social sciences 
out of existence, even while they claim to answer all the questions that have puzzled us for so 
long. 
  An important part of this change is that natural scientists for the most part genuinely 
believe that there is no need for libraries. They do not use physical libraries at all at this point. 
Many of them do not think that the humanities and humanistic social sciences produce 
disciplined research, but rather opinion decked out in erudition and fine words. In 2006, I had to 
write a theoretical article giving a full computational theory of library research merely to 
convince the scientist on Chicago's Library Task Force that we shouldn't just shut the place 
down. 
  On the social science side, the one-size-fits-all ideology is less of a problem. There 
have been recurrent such "scientizations" of the social sciences in the last century, and only one 
has come close to succeeding - the transformation of economics from a broad form of highly 
rigorous theory and reflection into the mere engineering of capitalism. This recurrent failure of 
scientization follows from the political importance of social science results. The more useful 
social science is in politics, the more the political losers invest in critique of the "scientific" 
social science, on substantive, methodological, and data-quality grounds, usually by experts 
hired for the purpose. That critique then inevitably pushes the social sciences back towards 
semi-humanistic and semi-normative inquiry; even subtle methodological debates become, in 
effect, the weapons of concealed normative arguments, as we see from the endless debates of 
the literature on inequality. 
  The humanists seem to me more vulnerable. My colleagues in the humanities seem to 
be in love with "digital humanities," even though it is clear that many of the results it produces 
are artifactual. Having never lived in disciplines combining scientific and humanistic methods, 
the humanists are unprepared for this debate, which has raged continuously in my own 
discipline over the last hundred years. Perhaps once they get over their initial enthusiasm they 
will figure out that digital humanities doesn't really tell us much of any importance. An 
amusing example concerns keyword indexing. I wrote an article three years ago showing (with 
quantitative methods) that over the period 1870 - 1940 the published keyword indexes to thirty 
of the major British poets almost certainly had no effect on the amount of scholarship done on 
those poets. You will be amused to know that Digital Humanities Quarterly turned the piece 
down on the grounds that it wasn't relevant to them. That's the kind of people who apparently 
dominate digital humanities today - naive enthusiasts. 
  In the long run, however, the one-size-fits-all trend will fall back, as it always has. But 
we will need to be much more explicit about how exactly it is that humanistic knowledge 
works. That is what I have been doing in a series of papers on the theory of library research, 
ideals for non-cumulative knowledge, and so on. Our colleagues in the humanities have not 
mounted a serious theoretical defense of their enterprise, perhaps because they regard such a 
defense as too "scientific" in itself. But it will be required in a "one-size-fits-all" universe, 
because such a formal theory is the only kind of argument that will be heard.  
 
5. From Print to Picture 
 Finally, my fifth great change is the shift of the culture from print to images, a process 
that began with newspaper and magazine photography, that triumphed in television, and that 
has invaded the remaining strongholds of print via the internet. The main effect of this change 
on library research is its effect on our potential recruits to real scholarship, the undergraduate 
students. Let me say a few things about them. I should underscore that as a Chicago faculty 
member I routinely teach in the Chicago core, teaching great classics of social science to small 
groups of random elite 18-year-olds. And I have done a great deal of specific investigative work 
on these students, so what I am about to say is not simply opinion, but data based on dozens of 
interviews, special assignments, solicited reflections, and ethnographic work. 
  Our students' idea of knowledge is more shaped by surfing the internet than by reading 
discursive texts. Even the best students in the U. S. draw their concept of knowledge from their 
internet experience. They therefore believe that knowledge consists of commodities rather than 
of arguments. They think that to know something is to know its location. They believe that 
knowledge is something one finds rather than something one creates. They do not even 
understand what knowledge IS, much less can they fashion genuine knowledge out of those few 
things that they do in fact know. Adept with their machines, they are able to fashion texts that 
appear to be scholarly. Yet on careful reading, these texts prove to be mere simulacra. 
Moreover, the students do not know their texts to be simulacra, because they have no image of 
real knowledge by which to make that judgment. In fact, much that is in their texts is directly 
borrowed, for they also do not understand the difference between thinking for themselves and 
copying the thoughts of other people. They have lost the very idea of independent creation. 
Although weirdly sophisticated, they are simply illiterate, in the literal sense. They cannot parse 
complex texts. They cannot entertain complex arguments. Their notion of knowing is gliding 
over the surface of some complex ideas and producing a clever insight. 
  These things wouldn't matter, of course, if the images they handle so well could 
effectively represent arguments. But they cannot. In the short run - meaning forty or fifty years 
- there appears to be no possibility that we will be able to represent in images the kind of 
complex discursive structure that is the essence of expert knowledge. We cannot with pictures 
prove the fundamental theorem of the calculus or analyze the nature of justice or explain the 
origins of the Second World War. We can illustrate these things with pictures or movies, but we 
cannot reason about them. Rigorous imagistic arguments about such things may eventually be 
invented. But they do not exist now and will not do so for at least fifty - more likely one 
hundred - years. 
  As a result, the fact that even our most able students are becoming weaker and weaker 
at processing complex thought is a big problem, not just for library research but in fact for all 
forms of complex reasoning and expertise. Our students lack a set of skills that earlier 
generations brought to college by default, having been forced to learn them in secondary 
education. Therefore, we must systematically train a few students to follow us as experts in 
complex discursive thought, to follow us in what will be a lonely way, at least for several 
decades. This teaching will be harder than before, because potential intellectuals will not come 
to us with the skills we ourselves brought to graduate training. We have to do an immense 
amount of remediation. And I'm afraid that there are not necessarily going to be academic jobs 
for such people. The academic jobs will be taken by the professionalized simulacra, with their 
fatuous blogs, their flabby articles, and their self-advertisement. But we must focus on creating 
a few successors as real intellects. Where they work doesn't matter. What matters is that they 
exist and that they, too, be able to reproduce themselves. 
 
 II The Scholars Themselves 
 So those are my five major external trends, and my rough predictions for what can be 
done about them in the short run and what will happen in the long. Having shown these great 
external changes, let me now reflect on the changes in the scholars themselves. 
  I must first make an important distinction, between autonomous and heteronomous 
changes in researcher behavior. These things are very different. I can illustrate this distinction 
with the example of stored material. Many librarians have found that stored material is not used 
as much as they or faculty expected it to be. There are of course two possible theories for this 
phenomenon. One is that we overestimated faculty interest in stored material. The other is that 
harried faculty simply pass over things that aren't available and find work-arounds for stored 
material. On the second theory, access drives use. 
  The second is clearly the true explanation. So for example, I reviewed eight years of 
circulation data from Chicago's Regenstein Library and found that 21% of the 4.5 million items 
in Regenstein had circulated at least once to a patron.  Half of that material circulated only 
once, from which one could infer that it was unusual material, necessary only to a researcher. A 
trustee or a librarian might say "it's cost-effective to send this material offsite." But 450,000 
items over the course of 365 * 8 or 2,920 days means that 154 times A DAY a researcher found 
something on the shelf when he or she needed it, and that is JUST material that was circulated. 
Given that we know that in traditional library research several items are considered for each 
item circulated, that means if these things were stored, on the order of 500 items a day would 
not be found by researchers who needed them when they needed them. 
  Now obviously, researchers who run into stored items dozens of times per research day 
are forced to change their practices. There's no choice in the matter. If the laboratory is locked, 
you have to do non-laboratory work. So you become more theoretical in your research, you do 
administrivia, you scan acres of irrelevancies on the internet, and so on. To be sure, there could 
also be autonomous change in faculty behavior - that's what I'm about to address. But the 
important point here is that behavior never indicates choice pure and simple, it indicates choice 
under existing constraints. So it is a mistake to use researcher behavior as a simply guide to 
"research practices." The relatively low use of stored material mainly reflects constrained 
scholarly practices; it's a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
  This distinction must be remembered for all research behaviors in libraries. It means for 
example that Lib Qual and other kinds of library surveys tend to produce systematically 
misleading results, because they tend to ignore constraint. But it also means that in evaluating 
new developments, we need to remember the constraints and losses they induce. Thus, we have 
massive online keyword indexes, but we can no longer use access as a proxy for quality. We 
have huge numbers of on-line texts, but many of them are not warranted or even stable. We 
have search engines like Google, but we lack authoritative reference works, partly because the 
vaunted importance of timeliness leads reference producers to rush underwhelming reference 
volumes into print or online. My library has 1001 print items published by Oxford with the 
word "Handbook" in the title, plus 568 electronic items. Needless to say, these works are of 
very uneven quality. 
  But while constraint is an important - even a central - determinant of researcher 
behavior, it is important to look at what is happening in the disciplines on internal grounds, and 
to try to think about why it is happening. Important parts of the future of library research 
depend upon this. There ARE some real causes for change within scholarship, and these too 
must be discussed. I shall consider three. 
  1. demographic restructuring 
 2. laziness and trendiness 
 3. boredom 
 
1. Demographic Restructuring 
 A first change is, I think, derivable from the demographic pattern I discussed at the 
outset. As academia has aged, a larger proportion of all scholars are in the middle and later 
career stages. I noted earlier that this meant they had less time for reading and thinking. It also 
means that, according to the normative career model established during the years of expansion, 
they are supposed to be producing crowning works, major advances, decisive claims. And 
indeed there are more and more reviews and syntheses, more and more claims to major 
advance, more and more repackagings of past revolutions. The result is a massive churning of 
the scholarly record and an increase in the kinds of general claims, synthetic judgments, and 
comprehensive theories that are normatively appropriate to the life stages which now dominate 
the academy. The fact that these have been produced on the basis of less reading and thinking 
than they were heretofore is inherent in the scholarly world today's middle-aged faculty have 
inhabited, one in which overproduction has been a way of life since graduate school. So there's 
more general material, and it's of lower quality, just on life course grounds. 
  An important reason for this churning is that at the most general level, the humanities 
and the humanistic social sciences don't really cumulate. The general ideas are perennial ones, 
and while cumulation happens within the little groupings that I have elsewhere called 
generational paradigms, it does not happen at the level of "economics versus sociology" or 
"what is the nature of the social self?" So what we have is a surfeit of personalistic syntheses, 
largely unreadable because they keep repeating the same things in slightly different languages. 
It is then quite unsurprising that colleagues are not bothering to read them. 
  All of this follows simply from the changing demography of the academic world. And 
as I noted before, there is no prospect of a change in that demography. Rather, we require new 
career norms to resolve this problem.  
 
2. Laziness and Trendiness 
  Another possibility, and we need to be frank about it, is simple laziness. I have 
colleagues who for years have sent RA's to the library to pick up their needed books, as if shelf 
browsing didn't matter, and as if the on-line bibliographical system alone could match the 
productivity of bibliography done in the library with a mixture of on-line and print materials. I 
can understand this practice in literary studies, perhaps, with its supposed focus on infinitely 
careful reading of particular texts. But even so, editing and contextual analysis surely require 
the multiple editions, density of reference tools, and other such things available only in the 
physical library. 
  I do understand that this practice of RA checkout was in part installed by the librarians, 
and was seen by them as a convenience to faculty. But for the actual library researchers, rather 
than say the experimental psychologists whom the University of Illinois Library wooed by 
delivering copies of reprints to their offices, not being in the library is a real mistake. And in 
that sense libraries that pioneered service to the faculty doorstep were in fact simply catering to 
faculty laziness. 
  But what about the larger historical picture? In fact data seem to indicate that faculty 
presence in the main libraries has been falling since the 1950s. Partly that of course reflects the 
long-term reaction to the original policy of centralizing libraries, which dates from the interwar 
and destroyed the prior habitus of library research, which was based on departmental libraries. 
But departmental library practice and centralized library practice both relied heavily on density 
of tools and rapid moves from tools to sources to new tools and so on, something which is not 
possible electronically because the vast majority of monographic material - with its wonderful 
indexing and bibliographical contents - remains in print only. 
  Oddly, the single most important recent force taking faculty out of the libraries was the 
personal computer. We can see clearly from historical data that the early 1980s saw a serious 
drop in faculty presence. The early PCs were non-portable. And each scholar had only one, 
which was typically at home in those years. Materials began to be taken home even if there 
were faculty studies in the library. That induced a change in faculty habits that the laptop has 
not redressed. 
  At the same time, I think faculty laziness is increased by the pressure that arises from 
the new forms of management and from demography. Faculty have to publish, and have to 
publish fast. They don't have the time to read much, and they don't, really, have the time to do 
the kind of careful, subtle bibliography they used to do. For real experts in scholarship, the 
electronic tools have the wonderful quality of enabling one quickly to find extremely esoteric 
facts - although without the deep sense of their provenance and warrantability that would have 
come when one found such things through traditional research practices - and these can serve as 
astounding spices in one's scholarly products. Since in the old days such facts served as secret 
indicators of truly profound scholarship, it is all the better to be able to produce such indicators 
by a simple counterfeit. 
  Complaints of this kind of counterfeiting began to be made about law review articles 
not long after the coming of the Shephard's citation system in the late nineteenth century, and 
they could be made routinely now for scholarship in general. The ability to counterfeit the old 
signals of quality is very great, with the new tools, and clearly scholars - even undergraduates 
occasionally - are doing so. So yes I think laziness is a problem, even if it is driven by the 
external pressure and the increased competition based on the differential demography. 
  In any case, our own library is within three blocks of the entire humanities and social 
sciences university. And only about 40 faculty are in the building as much as one hundred times 
a year, and 100 faculty 50 times a year. For example, three quarters of the history faculty is in 
the library less than once a week. That's shocking. It may, of course, simply reflect generational 
succession. The fact is that many younger colleagues don't actually know HOW to use print 
sources. They've never been taught and are too proud to admit they don't know. 
  I have to add a comment on trendiness. As I noted earlier, although I'm principally a 
library researcher, I've worked with search technologies and data mining throughout my career. 
And I can't help noticing in my peers’ new love for these techniques a certain mindless love of 
technology, which I think comes perhaps from the desperate need of the baby-boom generation 
and its successors to pretend to be young and hip. This techno-hip is pathetically clear in some 
of my colleagues, particularly those most interested in shedding their identity - chosen many 
years ago in different times - of being specialists in dead white men of various sorts. If you 
must study dead white men, I suppose, the least you can be is hip to technology. There is a 
great deal of this in the baby-boom generation, at least, for the 1960s has made them wary of 
becoming the powerful and dominant people they spent their youth criticizing. It is hard to 
imagine anything less hip than a great research library, or anything more unthinkingly dominant 
than a giant building with the grandiose pretentions of a Sterling or a Widener. I am sure that 
this too is part of what is happening with faculty.  
 
3. Boredom 
  Which brings me directly to my last and most frightening possibility. I think that a 
substantial number of scholars and researchers, at least of my generation, burned out fairly early 
on what they were trained to do and indeed, in many cases, became bored with their disciplines 
altogether. The clearest example of this, it seems to me, is studies of English literature and 
similarly canonical topics. I don't have life cycle data on these people, but I do think there's a 
pretty clear theoretical case to be made. 
  The mechanism is as follows. The whole idea of a modern canon was established 
around the turn of the twentieth century in the transforming American universities. The 
nineteenth century had already seen the emergence of collections of classic works, bound in 
common bindings, of the "Great Books" format, but aimed at the emerging middle class reading 
market. 
  The new young professors who came back from their German PhDs in the 1880s and 
1890s had been bored by the philological approach of the Germans, and decided to turn English 
literary studies from philology towards appreciation of this canon, probably as a part of that 
general American mimicry of upper class European culture that was also evident in the robber 
barons, whose sons were, of course, the object of this newly canonical education in any case. 
The great sociologist William Isaac Thomas began his life as such an English professor as did 
Wilbur Cross, who of course was a Yale English Professor before he became a governor and 
eventually a highway. 
  So the early twentieth century period of rapid university growth began with the idea of 
canonical instruction in literature, the arts, philosophy, and related things. It also had the idea of 
PhD level teaching, which meant that all the new teachers had to write dissertations. Given 
exponential growth in the professoriate from 1900 to about 1970, with a brief hiccup for the 
Second World War, it takes little imagination to understand what happened to the canon. 
Everything that could possibly be said about it was said a dozen times over. New people were 
added - John Donne in the 1940s, for example, and everything that could be said about him was 
rapidly exhausted, too. I am fairly certain that it is this mechanism, rather than pure politics, 
that explains why the 1960s social movements - the new focus on race, class, gender, the 
subaltern, etc. - created such sudden excitement in literary studies. It enabled you to write rafts 
of new dissertations about the same old canon and, furthermore, to announce new canons ad 
infinitum. 
  I don't need to tell you what later happened. Everybody developed his or her own 
canon, which led to cacophony, since it turned out that having the canon was what enabled 
literary scholars to understand each other’s work and the kind of allusion-filled prose that 
conveyed it. There resulted catastrophic fragmentation and the transformation of literary studies 
into a kind of second-rate social science, since most of the new critical readings of the canon 
were based on social and political analyses that were - by social scientific standards - naive at 
best. 
  But more important, I think it is also possible to perceive in the whole post 1970 
change another wave of boredom and disgust, precisely analogous to that experienced one 
hundred years before by Henry Canby, Wilbur Cross and their peers during their European 
sojourns, when desiccated German professors spent whole semesters working through the 
precise philology of sixty lines of Christopher Marlowe, without bothering themselves at all 
with the exact cultural profile of the face that launched a thousand ships and burnt the topless 
towers of Ilium. Indeed, that couplet itself tells us what has ultimately become of the canon of 
Wilbur Cross and company. If I taught a class today about the topless towers, chances are that 
many of my students would be thinking about the twin towers of a topless Christina Hendricks, 
and wondering why Faust was settling for just a kiss. Not to mention wondering what was this 
eternal damnation that he was worried about. 
  I think that profound sense of irrelevance has basically gutted much of the humanities. 
Probably less through the change in individual faculty than in the demographic replacement of 
older faculty by younger people simply uninterested in the classical problematics of the 
humanities and social sciences as they developed over the twentieth century. Similarly, my own 
discipline of sociology has turned largely into applied inequality studies. Anthropology has 
turned into general cultural studies, with relatively little connection with its history before 
Clifford Geertz. Much of the discipline of history has become Social Democracy 101, bringing 
this or that subordinated group into visibility and placing it at the center of attention. Much of 
the humanities proper - both here and in England - has turned very strongly towards 
contemporary literature and arts - particularly film - and also towards performance rather than 
scholarship. 
  And it could well be that this is not simply because sixteenth century theater is not 
relevant to contemporary adolescents, but also because, in fact, perhaps the basic intellectual 
questions of the great disciplines have been in fact resolved to the point where they are no 
longer interesting. Maybe the program of sociology laid out by Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and 
their generation has in fact been basically worked out. Maybe we understand the evolution of 
classical music quite fully. Maybe we have at last run out of the new things to say about why 
the First World War took place. 
 Thus it may not be so much that boredom is setting in as it is that the academic 
enterprise of the twentieth century actually succeeded beyond its wildest imagination, and it is 
time for some new way to arrive of being intellectual, of engaging the great and persistent 
ideas, of creating a truly new form of knowledge. In that sense, the opting-out that we see 
across faculty is just like Buddhist monks conniving at the destruction of a beautiful garden. 
They want the pleasure of building another. 
  That is a great and admirable challenge. As a creature of the old system, however, I just 
want to make sure that that challenge is not short-circuited by the ridiculous claim that what 
seems to be coming into existence is better than the great body of twentieth century 
achievement, or somehow transcends it, or improves it. No, it is basically starting over, and I 
wish it the best. 
  For myself, I'll witness for the old system, for the delightful practice of swinging along 
from source to source, both print and digital, of browsing and scanning, of reading and 
pondering, all in order to produce some limited piece of truly well-founded scholarship, using 
perhaps 10% of what I've found, rich in collateral references, seriously embedded in many 
contexts. I think that kind of thing is more likely to survive among amateurs than among 
academics being managed like hamsters in a cage. And I think it will preserve a certain ideal of 
knowledge that will be necessary to provide the yeast of intellectuality that will leaven the 
otherwise leaden and tasteless mass of digital and, perhaps ultimately, imagistic scholarship. 
Traditional library research stands for a kind of associational, aesthetic, and personal form of 
reasoning that when combined into a corporate project produces a form of knowing that is 
essential to humanity as a project. It's our job to preserve it until it is again recognized as 
centrally important, and connected effectively to whatever are going to be its lineal descendants 
in the next great effloration of knowledge.  
